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THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROSECUTION OF CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE METABOLITES UNDER UTAH CODE § 41-6A-517 
 
Joshua C. Snow* 
 
This Article achieves three main goals. First, it explains and 
explores Utah’s per se metabolite laws against the backdrop of the 
national landscape of metabolite laws. Second, this Article provides a 
concise explanation regarding the science of drug metabolites. Finally, 
this Article presents two constitutional challenges to Utah Code section 
41-6a-517. The first challenge argues that the statute creates an 
impermissible status offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. The second challenge argues that the statute violates 
Utah’s Uniform Operation of Laws Clause found in the Utah 
Constitution. This Article concludes by asking Utah state courts and 
state legislature to examine the validity of Utah Code section 41-6a-517 
and ultimately to overturn the statute. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine Steve. Steve, a recent graduate of the University of Utah S.J. 
Quinney College of Law, has never used illegal drugs or been in trouble with the 
law. But the stress of studying for his looming bar exam has begun to take an 
emotional toll. Acting on the advice of his less-than-law-abiding friends, Steve 
purchased a small quantity of marijuana thinking a few “hits” would relieve the 
anxiety and pressure he was feeling. The following Saturday he locked himself in 
his bedroom and smoked several marijuana cigarettes. He spent the remainder of 
Saturday and Sunday alone in his apartment. The immediate effects of the 
marijuana wore off quickly, but come Monday morning Steve felt relaxed and 
ready to face another week of studies. Before Steve left for his bar prep class, he 
decided to clean his car. Steve placed the car key in the ignition, turned on the 
electrical components of the car, and rolled the driver’s side window down. Steve 
sat down in the driver’s seat and began sorting through a pile of papers. As Steve 
was finishing the sorting, an officer on bike patrol approached Steve’s car to ask 
for directions. 
In his incident report, the officer stated he could immediately smell the odor 
of marijuana in the car. After briefly speaking with Steve, the officer reported he 
was certain the smell was coming from Steve’s person. The officer arrested Steve 
on suspicion of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a 
measureable controlled substance in the body in violation of Utah Code section 41-
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6a-517(2). Steve had exhibited no signs of intoxication during the encounter, nor 
did he engage in any dangerous, threatening, or suspicious behavior. A blood test 
was performed that revealed a trace presence of a pharmacologically inactive 
marijuana metabolite—a byproduct of the parent drug made as the human body 
processes the parent drug—in Steve’s system. 
After a quick trial, Steve was convicted as charged based solely on the 
testimony of the officer and the toxicology report. Steve’s license was suspended 
for 120 days, he was ordered to pay a fine of $1,000, he was placed on supervised 
probation, and, if he violates his probation, he could be placed in jail for up to six 
months. Also, Steve now bears the stigma of his conviction and must explain the 
conviction to the Character and Fitness Committee of the Utah Bar Association, 
his future employer, friends, and family. 
This Article examines how, despite the fact that Steve did not engage in any 
dangerous or threatening behavior that fateful Monday morning, he was 
successfully prosecuted under Utah Code section 41-6a-517 (Metabolite Statute) 
and explains why such prosecutions are unconstitutional. The Article first 
discusses the structure of the Metabolite Statute and what conduct is criminalized 
by the statute. The Article then wades into the science of metabolites and explains 
what they are, where they come from, and how they affect the body. Finally, it 
concludes by identifying why Utah’s Metabolite Statute is constitutionally flawed 
and why the prosecution of metabolites in the body should be prohibited in Utah. 
 
II.  THE STRUCTURE OF UTAH’S METABOLITE STATUTE, UTAH’S OTHER DRUG 
LAWS, AND NATIONAL PER SE DRUG LAWS 
 
Utah’s Metabolite Statute states, “[A] person may not operate or be in actual 
physical control1 of a motor vehicle within [Utah] if the person has any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person’s body.”2 
“A person convicted of a violation of [this section] is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor,”3 which is punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of 
$1,000, plus an additional 90% surcharge and $40 legislative fee, for a maximum 
total fine of $1,940.4 Additionally, “[t]he Driver License Division shall, if the 
                                                 
1 Utah courts define “actual physical control” very broadly. See, e.g., Richfield City v. 
Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (looking at a multitude of factors to 
determine whether defendant could have been driving a motor vehicle—and not limiting 
the statutory language to only those people actually driving a motor vehicle—to find 
defendant had “actual physical control” of the vehicle). Although the propriety or legality 
of such a definition is the subject of frequent debate, this issue will not be addressed in this 
Article. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to know that individuals can be 
convicted for being in actual physical control of a vehicle with a controlled substance 
metabolite in their body without exhibiting dangerous behavior. See id. 
2 UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). 
3 Id. § 41-6a-517(4)(a). 
4 See id. § 51-9-401(1)(b)(i)(C) (LexisNexis 2010); id. §§ 76-3-204(2), -301(1)(d) 
(LexisNexis 2004); id. § 78A-7-122(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
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person is 21 years of age or older on the date of arrest . . . suspend, for a period of 
120 days, the driver license of [the] person convicted.”5 For persons younger than 
twenty-one years old, or with prior convictions, the suspension may be lengthened 
or the individual’s driver’s license may be revoked for a period of one to two 
years.6 
The Metabolite Statute is codified in the same chapter as Utah’s driving under 
the influence (DUI) statute.7 But, the Metabolite Statute explicitly states it applies 
“[i]n cases not amounting to a violation” of the DUI statute.8 Utah’s DUI statute 
states, in relevant part: 
 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.9 
 
Analyzing the two statutes together, the Metabolite Statute applies to 
individuals who have detectable amounts of the controlled substance or its 
metabolite in their system, but are not under the influence of a controlled 
substance or its metabolite, and the metabolite does not make the individuals 
incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle.10 In essence, rather than punishing 
people for dangerous behavior, the Metabolite Statute punishes people for their 
status11 of having previously used illegal drugs.12 
Although little information is available regarding the creation and passage of 
the Metabolite Statute specifically,13 valuable insight into the reasoning and logic 
that created the section can be gleaned from an examination of other states with 
similar laws. According to a study sponsored by the National Highway Traffic 
                                                 
5 Id. § 41-6a-517(6)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
6 Id. § 41-6a-517(6)(b) to -517(8). 
7 See id. § 41-6a-502 (LexisNexis 2010). 
8 Id. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
9 Id. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010). 
10 Compare id. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (barring individuals from 
operating or being in actual physical control of a vehicle if there is any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite present in their systems), with id. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) 
(LexisNexis 2010) (prohibiting individuals from operating or being in actual physical 
control of a vehicle if they are under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, that renders 
them incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle). 
11 See infra Part IV. 
12 See State v. Robinson, 254 P.3d 183, 191–92 (Utah 2011) (“[S]imply having the 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the body is similar to a ‘status’ of having previously 
ingested the controlled substance.”). 
13 The state legislature passed an early version of the statute in the 1980s. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.6 (LexisNexis 1998) (recodified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6a-517 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012)). A thorough review of available state records and 
online legal sources did not provide any information regarding the passing of the specific 
provision at issue in this Article. 
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Safety Administration, six other states have statutes similar to Utah’s Metabolite 
Statute.14 Additionally, twelve other states have some form of law prohibiting 
individuals from driving with prohibited drugs in their system, but not prohibiting 
the metabolite of those drugs.15 Many of the remaining states have laws that focus 
on actual impairment, rather than on the mere presence of drugs or their 
metabolites in the system.16 
In support of these zero tolerance statutes, commentators have argued that 
there is a direct relationship between an unquantifiable amount of illicit drugs or 
their metabolites in a person’s system and the individual’s ability to safely operate 
a motor vehicle.17 These arguments generally assert that although “there [may be] 
no meaningful quantification of the relationship of the use of . . . drugs with 
evidence of impairment,” per se laws are still necessary to protect safety on the 
roads because there could be some relationship between the drugs and their 
metabolites and an individual’s ability to operate a motor vehicle safely.18 Other 
advocates of these per se laws argue that there is a growing problem of what they 
term “drugged driving.”19 According to these commentators, the easiest and most 
effective way to combat drugged driving is through a zero-tolerance standard, 
rather than through a standard requiring evidence of impairment or a quantifiable 
amount of an active drug in an individual’s system.20 Finally, some commentators 
argue a more pragmatic rationale: “The benefit of a per se standard is that 
prosecutors do not have to meet more complex and difficult to use standards of 
guilt.”21 
Although these statutes are purportedly designed to make prosecution simpler 
and more effective by removing the necessity to prove impairment or quantifiable 
levels of drugs in the system, the statutes are rife with ambiguity and complexity, 
which weaken their legitimacy and validity. One recent study attempted to test the 
                                                 
14 J. MICHAEL WALSH, A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF LAWS DEALING WITH 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS 4 (2009) (identifying Arizona, Delaware, 
Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Utah as states with a “zero tolerance” 
approach). 
15 See id. at 3–4 (identifying Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, 
Nevada, Ohio, Virginia, North Carolina, South Dakota, Hawaii, and New York with some 
form of controlled substance law). 
16 See id. (identifying Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, South Carolina, 
and Virginia as some of the states that use the standard of impairment to define “under the 
influence”). 
17 See, e.g., Mark F. Lewis & Betty J. Buchan, The Drugged Driver and the Need for 
a “Per Se” Law, 72 FLA. B.J. 32, 37–38 (1998). 
18 See, e.g., id. at 36 (discussing a case that applied this reasoning). 
19 See THE WALSH GRP., THE FEASIBILITY OF PER SE DRUGGED DRIVING 
LEGISLATION CONSENSUS REPORT 2 (2002), available at http://stopdruggeddriving.org/ 
pdfs/FeasabilityofPerSeLawsConsensusReport.pdf. 
20 Id. at 4. 
21 Drugged Driving Laws, STOP DRUGGED DRIVING, http://stopdruggeddriving.org/ 
laws.html (last visited May 20, 2013). 
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actual effectiveness of these zero-tolerance statutes in making roads safer.22 
According to the researchers, states that have instituted a zero-tolerance policy 
have recorded very little to no information to determine if the statutes are 
effective.23 Instead, prosecutors and law enforcement officials rely on anecdotal 
stories to evaluate the statutes.24 The researchers reported that in general, 
prosecutors and law enforcement officials felt the statutes were effective at easing 
the burden of prosecution and conviction, but there was no mention of the ability 
of these statutes to reduce the actual number of drugged or impaired drivers.25 
Another problem undermining the value of per se statutes is the wide variety 
of ways states prosecute the presence of metabolites in a driver’s system. As 
discussed above, Utah’s statute criminalizes the presence of metabolites of any 
controlled substance.26 By contrast, Minnesota’s statute makes it a crime for a 
person to operate a motor vehicle if “the person's body contains any amount of a 
controlled substance . . . or its metabolite, other than marijuana or 
tetrahydrocannabinols.”27 Other states require that a certain quantity of any illegal 
drug metabolite be found in a person’s system to sustain a conviction.28 
The Utah Code does not contain any other provision punishing an individual 
for the mere presence of controlled substance metabolites in the body. There are, 
however, provisions that address the criminality of drug use in relation to the 
presence of metabolites in an individual’s system. For example, Utah Code 
Annotated section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) makes it a crime “for any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled 
substance.”29 In the statute, “‘[p]ossession’ or ‘use’ means the joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the 
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption” of a controlled 
substance.30 According to the Code, “‘Consumption’ means ingesting or having 
any measurable amount of a controlled substance in a person's body, but . . . does 
not include the metabolite of a controlled substance.”31 The Utah Supreme Court 
has also found that the mere presence of a measurable amount or the metabolite of 
a controlled substance is insufficient to show that a defendant used or possessed a 
controlled substance within the state.32 
                                                 
22 See JOHN LACEY ET AL., DRUG PER SE LAWS: A REVIEW OF THEIR USE IN STATES 1 
(2010) (studying the laws of twelve states that do not tolerate any amount of prohibited 
drugs in a driver’s system while operating a motor vehicle to assess the effects of per se 
drug laws). 
23 See id. at 2. 
24 Id. 
25 See id. 
26 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-517 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
27 MINN. STAT. § 169A.20 subdiv. 1(7) (West Supp. 2010). 
28 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
29 UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2012). 
30 Id. § 58-37-2(1)(ii). 
31 Id. § 58-37-2(1)(c) (emphasis added). 
32 State v. Ireland, 133 P.3d 396, 402 (Utah 2006). 
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The question then becomes, what is it about metabolites that result in their 
different treatment in various code sections within the state and among different 
states? Why is it that Minnesota lawmakers felt their statute could exempt 
marijuana metabolites while prosecuting for all other controlled substance 
metabolites, but Utah lawmakers felt it was appropriate to punish the presence of 
any controlled substance metabolites in an individual’s body? Similarly, why is it 
that some states do not punish for the presence of metabolites in a driver’s system 
while others require a minimum threshold level?33 Even more perplexing is why 
Utah’s possession and use statutes explicitly prohibit prosecuting an individual 
based on the presence of metabolites, but permit prosecuting an individual based 
on the presence of metabolites if the individual happens to be in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle. To understand why metabolites have been given such 
disparate treatment, this Article will discuss the science of metabolites in the 
following section. 
 
III.  METABOLITES: NO MORE DANGEROUS THAN A HELPING OF VEGEMITE 
 
It seems inane to compare a controlled substance metabolite to the bitter 
Australian treat Vegemite. The two are drastically different. One is a byproduct of 
the metabolic process of breaking down a controlled substance, and the other is 
made from leftover brewer’s yeast. But what they do have in common is that, in 
many cases, the two substances are pharmacologically inactive and do not have 
any impact on an individual’s mental or physical capabilities. This Part explains 
what metabolites are and where they come from. It also shows how many 
metabolites do not have any influence on the abilities or capacities of the human 
body. Finally this Part describes how the presence of controlled substance 
metabolites in an individual’s blood or urine does nothing more than show that an 
individual had ingested a controlled substance at some prior point. 
 
A.  What are Metabolites? 
 
“A drug metabolite is a product or substance that comes from (and is 
chemically different from) a parent drug; it is formed within the human body from 
the parent drug by the process of biotransformation or metabolism.”34 When a drug 
enters the body it goes through five distinct phases.35 These five stages are (1) 
absorption, (2) distribution, (3) biotransformation, (4) translocation, and (5) 
                                                 
33 Virginia’s driving while intoxicated statute does not include a metabolite provision, 
and instead focuses solely on impairment. The word “metabolite” does not appear 
anywhere in Virginia’s code. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (2009); see also OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (allowing for prosecution for the presence 
of metabolites, but only if they exceed a certain threshold level). 
34 FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, RESOLVING DRUG ISSUES 43 (1993). 
35 Kurt M. Dubowski, Drug-Use Testing: Scientific Perspectives, 11 NOVA L. REV. 
415, 523 (1987). 
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excretion.36 Absorption refers to the process by which the drug is “ingested, 
injected or absorbed through mucous membranes or other portals” into the body.37 
During the distribution phase, the drug reaches the body’s circulation system and is 
carried to all of the “tissues and organs of the body, where the free drug can exert 
effects, or be stored, excreted, and metabolized or otherwise biotransformed, 
depending upon the organ, tissue and drug.”38 During the distribution phase, some 
tissues and organs are passive and completely unaffected by the presence of the 
drug in the system.39 Other organs, however, such as the lungs and liver, “convert 
the parent drug into chemically different metabolites or biotransformation 
products, in which forms it can be stored, or eliminated” from the body.40 
These “metabolites can be pharmacologically inert, or possess activity which 
is less than, equal to, or greater than the parent drug.”41 This biotransformation 
process continues until the entire drug has been eliminated from the body.42 The 
final two stages, translocation and excretion, occur primarily through this 
metabolic process.43 For example, ethanol is “predominantly disposed of through 
extensive metabolism in the liver.”44 These metabolites are then disposed of 
through bodily excretions such as urine.45 
 
B.  What Does It Mean when a Drug Test Reveals the Presence of a Drug 
Metabolite in an Individual’s System? 
 
Drug testing, whether in urine, blood, or some other bodily excretion, can 
reveal the presence of both the active drug as well as the inactive metabolites of 
the parent drug. But what does it mean for a test to come back positive for the 
presence of a metabolite? A drug test revealing the presence of a metabolite does 
not indicate intentional drug use,46 it does not reveal if the drug was accidentally 
inhaled or injected, and it does not reveal the quantity or source of the metabolite.47 
The presence of a metabolite in the body does not always equate with recent 
absorption either.48 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that an individual’s 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 524. 
38 Id. at 524–25. 
39 Id. at 525. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 523–26. 
44 Id. at 525. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 516. 
47 See id. 
48 See Commonwealth v. DiPanfilo, 993 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(recognizing that marijuana metabolites can remain in the body for months and that cocaine 
metabolites remain in the body for two to four days after use); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra 
note 34, at 45. 
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“pattern of elimination for a given drug cannot be predicted with perfect 
accuracy.”49 Also, the bodily fluid being tested may affect the results of testing for 
the presence of metabolites in the body.50 
The rate at which drugs metabolize varies greatly among individuals.51 For 
example, marijuana (or its active ingredient THC) is quickly detectable in the 
blood stream after consumption.52 THC is immediately circulated through the body 
where it is stored in fat tissue.53 The rate at which the body metabolizes a drug 
varies conditioned upon a host of factors specific to the individual user.54 As THC 
is metabolized, its inactive metabolites are released into the blood stream where, in 
the average case, they can be detected for a few days up to several weeks.55 Also, 
heavy or chronic use can lengthen the amount of time that metabolites appear in 
the body.56 
There is even some evidence indicating that, because marijuana metabolites 
are easily absorbed by fat cells, the metabolites may become stored in fat tissues of 
chronic users. The chronic user’s body may release those metabolites at a 
significantly later period of time, anywhere from months to years, when the 
individual experiences stress or begins exercising and dieting.57 Although such 
claims are typically relegated to the annals of urban myths, a group of researchers 
at the University of Sydney, Australia, conducted a study on rats to test the 
plausibility of these stories.58 The researchers concluded that inducing stress or 
depriving food from rats that had previously been exposed to marijuana triggered 
an increased level of marijuana metabolites in the body, even when there had been 
no recent exposure to the drug.59 The researchers extrapolated that their results 
“might help to explain anomalous cases where prior cannabis users, that were 
                                                 
49 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 658 (1989). 
50 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989) (recognizing that 
metabolites of some drugs remain in the urine for a longer period of time than in blood). 
51 See Charles R. Cordova, Jr., Note, DWI and Drugs: A Look at Per Se Laws for 
Marijuana, 7 NEV. L.J. 570, 578–79 (2007). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 579. 
54 Id. at 578–81. Cf. Kimberly S. Keller, Sobering Up Daubert: Recent Issues Arising 
in Alcohol-Related Expert Testimony, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 124 (2004) (identifying 
weight, gender, age, mental state, drinking pattern, type of alcohol, amount of alcohol, 
duration of ingestion, presence of food in the stomach, and the type of food as factors that 
may affect the metabolic process of alcohol). 
55 Cordova, supra note 51, at 578. 
56 See FIONA J. COUPER & BARRY K. LOGAN, WASH. STATE PATROL, DRUGS AND 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACT SHEET 9 (2004), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/ 
injury/research/job185drugs/drugs_web.pdf. 
57 N. Gunasekaran et al., Reintoxication: The Release of Fat-Stored Δ9-
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) into Blood Is Enhanced by Food Deprivation or ACTH 
Exposure, 158 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 1330, 1330 (2009). 
58 See id. 
59 Id. at 1336. 
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exposed to extreme stress or had undergone intensive weight loss, tested positive 
for THC a long time after they had refrained from cannabis use.”60 
In sum, the presence of a metabolite in the body does not necessarily equate 
with present intoxication.61 In fact, the presence of a metabolite does not even 
equate with recent ingestion.62 Further, the presence of a metabolite cannot 
demonstrate the method or amount of ingestion.63 The only relevant information 
that a metabolite reveals is that at some prior time, an individual was exposed to 
the chemical compound that metabolized into the present metabolite.64 It is for 
these reasons that states have struggled to formulate a consistent policy for 
handling metabolites in drivers’ systems. The only remaining question is whether 
Utah can punish drivers for having the inactive metabolite of a controlled 
substance in their bodies while being in actual physical control of motor vehicles. 
 
IV.  UTAH CANNOT PUNISH AN INDIVIDUAL FOR THE PRESENCE OF  
METABOLITES IN THE BODY BECAUSE DOING SO WOULD BE  
AN IMPERMISSIBLE STATUS OFFENSE 
 
Although states have a great deal of power and discretion in punishing 
individuals for drug use and possession, there are limits to that power. This Part 
argues that punishing an individual for the presence of metabolites in the body is 
an impermissible status offense in violation of the U.S. Constitution. 
 
A.  The State May Punish an Individual for Using Drugs 
 
It has long been recognized that 
 
[t]here can be no question of the authority of the State in the exercise of 
its police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use 
of dangerous and habit-forming drugs. . . . The right to exercise this 
power is so manifest in the interest of the public health and welfare, that 
it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is 
too firmly established to be successfully called in question.65 
 
Accordingly, Utah’s statutes that punish the use or possession of controlled 
substances are not, on their face, constitutionally defective.66 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reviewed the constitutionality of the state’s 
statutes governing the possession or consumption of controlled substances.67 In 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 COUPER & LOGAN, supra note 56, at 9. 
62 See id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 8–9. 
65 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962) (quoting Whipple v. Martinson, 
256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921)). 
66 See State v. Robinson, 254 P.3d 183, 193 (Utah 2011). 
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State v. Robinson,68 the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence.69 
The results of a blood test revealed the presence of active methamphetamine in the 
defendant’s body.70 Based on the results of the test, the State charged the defendant 
with the possession or use of a controlled substance for having a measurable 
amount of a controlled substance in his system.71 Following his conviction, the 
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the possession or consumption 
statutes.72 Recognizing the State’s inherent power to regulate the sale and use of 
controlled substances, the court rejected the defendant’s due process, equal 
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment arguments.73 Finally, the court 
rejected the defendant’s argument under Robinson v. California74 that the statute 
was punishing his status as a drug user rather than punishing his drug use.75 The 
court found that because the statute was punishing him based on the measurable 
amount of the active controlled substance found in his body, the statute was 
punishing him for his use of the drug, not for his status.76 Because the defendant 
still had active methamphetamine in his system, the court found he still had a 
measurable amount of a controlled substance and was still using the drug.77 But, 
the court did say, in dictum, that “simply having the metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the body is similar to a ‘status’ of having previously ingested the 
controlled substance. Thus, if Utah’s measureable amount provision criminalized 
the presence of metabolites in a person’s body, [the defendant]’s argument might 
have merit.”78 According to the court, 
 
the “use” of a controlled substance clearly begins at ingestion, [and] that 
“use” continues until the user is no longer under the influence of the 
drug. In other words, use stops and a user is no longer under the 
influence of drugs when the user no longer has a measurable amount of 
the drug in his or her body.79 
 
Accordingly, it remains permissible for a state to punish individuals while they are 
still using the drug.80 But, when a statute punishes an individual for the presence of 
a pharmacologically inactive drug metabolite in the body, the statute is prosecuting 
                                                 
67 See id. at 184. 
68 254 P.3d 183. 
69 Id. at 185. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 186–90. 
74 370 U.S. 660 (1961). 
75 Robinson, 254 P.3d at 190–92. 
76 Id. at 191. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 191–92. 
79 Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted). 
80 See id. 
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the individual’s status as a previous drug user, and not the individual’s actual use.81 
This is bolstered by the fact that a drug metabolite is chemically different from the 
actual drug and is typically pharmacologically inactive—having no effect on the 
individual.82 The metabolic process has removed the controlled substance from the 
body and the individual is no longer using the controlled substance.83 This then 
raises the question of whether a state can punish individuals for their status as 
previous drug users, proven only by the presence of an inactive drug metabolite in 
the individuals’ systems. 
 
B.  The State May Not Criminalize an Individual’s Drug User Status 
 
Although a state may criminalize drug use, it may not criminalize an 
individual’s status as a drug user. On occasion, states have attempted to define 
crimes not in terms of acts, but in states of being or statuses.84 Some historical 
statutes “have made it a crime to be a vagrant, a common prostitute, a common 
drunkard, a common gambler, or a beggar.”85 It was not until 1962, however, that 
the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the validity of these status crimes.86 In 
Robinson v. California, the State of California had made it a crime for an 
individual to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.”87 In overturning the California 
statute, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the statute “is not one which punishes a 
person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for 
antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration . . . . Rather, 
we deal with a statute which makes the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal 
offense.”88 The Court continued by recognizing that a drug addiction can be 
considered a disease and to punish the status of that disease would be to inflict a 
cruel and unusual punishment upon the individual.89 
Unfortunately, the Court did not clarify how far its holding would extend or 
whether only a limited number of statuses, such as diseases and mental conditions, 
were covered by the holding.90 Although the Robinson opinion left much to be 
desired, “there is general consensus that the Court declared . . . that statutes that 
make ‘status’ a crime are unconstitutional because they inflict cruel and unusual 
punishment.”91 
                                                 
81 See id. at 191–92. 
82 See Dubowski, supra note 35, at 525. 
83 Id. 
84 LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
97 (1975). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962). 
88 Id. at 666. 
89 Id. at 666–67. 
90 BERKSON, supra note 84, at 98–99. 
91 Id. at 99. 
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The Supreme Court attempted to clarify its holding several years later, in 
Powell v. Texas.92 There, the Court stated, 
 
The entire thrust of Robinson’s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the 
accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which 
society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common 
law terms, has committed some actus reus.93 
 
With Powell, the focus has shifted away from the individual and towards the 
requirement that the individual must have committed some act or exhibited some 
behavior that society has an interest in preventing.94 
Other courts have had the opportunity to expand the Robinson holding beyond 
the context of California’s statute against narcotic addiction.95 For example, in 
Parker v. Municipal Judge,96 the Nevada Supreme Court invalidated a law that 
made it a crime to be a “disorderly person.”97 According to the statute, a disorderly 
person was one who had the physical ability to work, had no visible means of 
support, and was in a public place.98 The court held that because the statute was 
punishing an individual’s status of being out of work and in a public place, without 
having committed any act, the statute was unconstitutional.99 
Similarly, laws that prohibit an individual from operating a motor vehicle 
with the presence of a drug metabolite in the body are prohibited status crimes.100 
According to one commentator discussing the application of per se statutes to 
marijuana metabolites, 
 
While most drug metabolites will remain in the blood for only a short 
time, marijuana can be detected for weeks after the narcotic effect has 
worn off. This contributes to punishing status as a user, not protecting 
safety, a premise that was expressly found to be unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court.101 
 
                                                 
92 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
93 Id. at 533. 
94 See id. 
95 BERKSON, supra note 84, at 101–07. 
96 427 P.2d 642 (Nev. 1967). 
97 Id. at 643–44. 
98 Id. at 643. 
99 Id. at 643–44. 
100 See Mark Hansen, Drugged State: Ohio Pushes for Tough Laws for Drivers, 
Critics Question Impairment Issue, 91 A.B.A. J. 12, 14 (2005). 
101 Aaron J. Marcus, Are the Roads a Safer Place Because Drug Offenders Aren’t on 
Them?: An Analysis of Punishing Drug Offenders with License Suspensions, 13 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 557, 574 (2004). 
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In essence, punishing individuals for having a metabolite in the body fails to 
further any legitimate goal, such as ensuring safety on the roads, because there is 
no correlation between pharmacologically inactive metabolites and dangerous 
driving. Instead, it is only punishing individuals for their status as a prior drug 
user.102 Further, the presence of a metabolite alone cannot prove that an individual 
knowingly engaged in any illegal behavior because metabolites do not reveal 
whether a drug was consumed intentionally.103 
Some may argue that Utah’s Metabolite Statute is not punishing individuals 
for their status as prior drug users, but for the act of being in control of a motor 
vehicle while a metabolite is still in the body. For example, in Arizona v. 
Hammonds,104 an Arizona court considered a constitutional challenge to Arizona’s 
metabolite statute.105 There, the court noted that the “presence of an inactive and 
nonimpairing metabolite of an illicit drug in a driver’s urine does not necessarily 
mean that there is no active component of that drug present in the driver’s 
blood.”106 According to the court’s argument, it is appropriate for a state to punish 
an individual for driving a motor vehicle with the metabolite in the body because 
the metabolite may be the only way to establish that the individual was operating a 
motor vehicle with drugs in the system.107 The court seemed particularly concerned 
with the speed with which the metabolic process may break down drugs, making it 
nearly impossible in some instances for the state to prove that an individual was 
operating a motor vehicle with the active drug in the system.108 
This reasoning is flawed, however, because it highlights the problems with 
prosecuting individuals for having a drug metabolite in their system. Because there 
is no way of knowing when, how, or where the metabolite entered the body, the 
state cannot prove that an individual was operating a motor vehicle with the active 
controlled substance in the body.109 Likewise, unless a urine or blood sample 
reveals the presence of the active controlled substance in the body, absent 
additional evidence, there is no proof that the individual was under the influence of 
the controlled substance while operating the motor vehicle.110 All that the 
metabolite reveals is that at some prior time the individual had an active controlled 
substance in the body.111 Despite attempting to draw attention to the fact that the 
individual chose to operate a motor vehicle, the statute still punishes an individual 
for a status as a drug user, and not for any actual harm posed to the individual or 
society. 
                                                 
102 Id. 
103 See Dubowski, supra note 35, at 516. 
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Because the statute is focused solely on punishing individuals for their status 
as drug users and not for any specific activity or act, the statute must be considered 
an unconstitutional status offense. But even if Utah courts find that the statute is 
not an impermissible status offense, the statute may still be struck down on equal 
protection grounds. The following Part shows how Utah’s Metabolite Statute 
violates Utah’s equivalent of the federal Equal Protection Clause. 
 
V.  BY MAKING EXCEPTIONS FOR LEGAL USE, UTAH’S METABOLITE STATUTE 
VIOLATES UTAH’S UNIFORM OPERATIONS OF LAWS CLAUSE 
 
Utah’s Constitution requires that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation.”112 To determine whether a statute violates this requirement, 
the court analyzes (1) whether the statute creates any classifications, (2) whether 
the classifications impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly situated, 
and (3) if there is disparate treatment, whether “the legislature had any reasonable 
objective that warrants the disparity.”113 If the classification does not involve a 
suspect class or a fundamental right, the court will engage in a rational basis 
review of the legislature’s objective in creating the section.114 “The essence of the 
uniform operation of laws principle is that ‘legislative classifications resulting in 
differing treatment for different persons must be based on actual differences that 
are reasonably related to the legitimate purposes of the legislation.’”115 The first 
two questions, requiring a classification and disparate treatment, must be answered 
                                                 
112 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24. Although the Utah uniform operation of laws clause 
appears to be the equivalent of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause, the two clauses can create very different results. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 
572, 577 (Utah 1993). 
 
Utah’s uniform operation of laws provision establishes different requirements 
than does the federal Equal Protection Clause. The most important of these 
requirements, for the present analysis, is the requirement that “[f]or a law to be 
constitutional under [the provision], it is not enough that it be uniform on its 
face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not 
operate uniformly if ‘persons similarly situated’ are not ‘treated similarly’ . . . .” 
 
State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995) (alterations in original). Utah courts have 
asserted that the standard under Utah’s uniform operation of laws clause is “at least as 
exacting, and in some circumstances, more rigorous than the standard applied under the 
federal constitution.” Whitmer v. City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) (quoting 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 889 (Utah 1988)). For 
this reason, this Article only analyzes the Metabolite Statute under the Utah standard 
instead of the federal constitutional standard as well. 
113 See State v. Drej, 233 P.3d 476, 487 (Utah 2010) (quoting State v. Schofield, 63 
P.3d 667, 671 (Utah 2002)). 
114 See Merril v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 223 P.3d 1089, 1093 (Utah 2009). 
115 Id. at 1092 (quoting Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1995)). 
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in the affirmative before the court will consider the third.116 The next Section 
discusses these three questions in the context of the Metabolite Statute. 
 
A.  Utah’s Metabolite Statute Creates Classifications That Result in 
Disparate Treatment 
 
First, the metabolite statute creates classifications. The statute distinguishes 
between individuals by creating an affirmative defense to prosecution for those 
who have been given a prescription or legal authorization to use the controlled 
substance.117 Second, the statute imposes disparate treatment on persons similarly 
situated. Two individuals with metabolites and no active drug in their system after 
ingesting the same controlled substance—one legally with a prescription and the 
other illegally—will be treated differently if they are subsequently stopped while 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. The individual who has a prescription 
will escape legal liability, but the individual without a prescription may face 
prosecution and the attendant consequences if convicted. Because the statute 
makes classifications and those classifications result in disparate treatment, the 
court must then consider whether “the legislature had any reasonable objective that 
[would] warrant[] the disparity” under a rational basis review.118 
 
B.  Utah’s Metabolite Statute Fails Rational Basis Review 
 
The first step in evaluating a statute under rational basis review is to 
determine if the classification is reasonable.119 A court, in evaluating the 
reasonableness of a classification should consider, 
 
(1) if there is a greater burden on one class as opposed to another without 
a reason; (2) if the statute results in unfair discrimination; (3) if the 
statute creates a classification that is arbitrary or unreasonable; or (4) if 
the statute singles out similarly situated people or groups without 
justification.120 
 
With regard to the Metabolite Statute, the classification fails this test. First, there is 
a greater burden on those individuals without a prescription as compared to those 
with a prescription without reason. Presumably, the statute was enacted for safety 
reasons to prevent individuals with metabolites in their system from driving on the 
                                                 
116 See id. 
117 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-517(3)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (setting forth an 
affirmative defense for prescription drugs); id. § 41-6a-517(3)(c) (establishing an 
affirmative defense for those drugs “otherwise legally ingested”). 
118 See Drej, 233 P.3d at 487 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Schofield, 
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road.121 Assuming, arguendo, that metabolites in an individual’s system are 
dangerous, the presence of metabolites in the system of an individual with a 
prescription will be just as dangerous as a metabolite in the system of an individual 
without a prescription. There is no reason for the greater burden—that is, the threat 
of prosecution—placed on those without a prescription. 
Second, the statute results in unfair discrimination. Without any justification 
for the disparate treatment in the Metabolite Statute, the discrimination is 
inherently unfair. 
Third, the statute creates a classification that is arbitrary or unreasonable. It is 
almost axiomatic to say that metabolites react in an individual’s body in a manner 
that has no relationship to the external fact of whether the individual has a 
prescription or legal authorization to use the medication. If a metabolite is 
dangerous, it will be dangerous whether the user has a prescription or not. 
Accordingly, the classification at issue here is either arbitrary in that there is no 
justification, or unreasonable as it is merely a disguise by the state legislature to 
create a status offense to punish drug users. Because there is no legitimate 
justification to allow individuals with prescriptions to be in control of motor 
vehicles with metabolites in their system while criminalizing individuals without 
prescriptions, the statute is unreasonable and fails rational basis review. 
Although the statute fails rational basis review, it is informative to complete 
the analysis under Utah’s uniform operation of laws test. The second part of the 
test is to determine whether “the legislature has a legitimate objective in creating 
the classification.”122 The court does not, “however, ‘accept any conceivable 
reason for the legislation. . . . Rather, [the court] judge[s] such enactments on the 
basis of reasonable or actual legislative purposes.’”123 
In the Metabolite Statute, there appears to be no legitimate objective in 
creating the classification. The presumed objective in enacting the statute was to 
make Utah’s roads safer.124 If it is dangerous for an individual to operate a motor 
vehicle with a controlled substance metabolite in the body, it will be dangerous 
regardless of whether the individual has a prescription. It would be unreasonable to 
say that the state would be willing to allow a certain set of allegedly dangerous 
drivers to operate on the roads, while prohibiting another set of equally dangerous 
drivers. It is illustrative that Utah’s DUI law does not make a similar exception 
allowing individuals with a prescription to control a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of a controlled substance.125 This lack of distinction is for the obvious 
reason that an individual under the influence of a drug, whether legally or illegally 
consumed, is dangerous. Without a reasonable and legitimate purpose, the statute 
fails rational basis review under Utah’s uniform operation of laws requirement. 
                                                 
121 See State v. Robinson, 254 P.3d 183, 191 (Utah 2011) (recognizing that the 
consumption of a drug “is most hazardous to the user and those around him”). 
122 Merrill, 223 P.3d at 1094. 
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124 See Lewis & Buchan, supra note 17, at 36. 
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This line of reasoning has been recognized by other jurisdictions. The Georgia 
Supreme Court, in Love v. Georgia,126 found that a similar provision in the Georgia 
code violated the state’s version of the uniform operation clause.127 At issue in 
Love was a statute similar to Utah’s statute.128 On appeal the defendant attacked 
the State’s interest in prohibiting drivers from operating a motor vehicle with a 
controlled substance metabolite in their body by focusing on the exceptions, or 
affirmative defenses, carved out by the Georgia General Assembly.129 The 
defendant argued, and the court agreed, that 
 
the statute allows a person with metabolites of legally-used [controlled 
substances] in his body fluids to be convicted of driving with [controlled 
substances] in his system only if it is established that he was “rendered 
incapable of driving safely” while a person with metabolites of illegally-
used [controlled substances] can be found guilty of driving with 
[controlled substances] in his system without evidence of impairment.130 
 
The court recognized that there is no difference in the effects of legally used 
controlled substances and illegally used controlled substances.131 Because there is 
no difference in how the controlled substances affect the body, the classification, 
made by the Georgia General Assembly between legal users and illegal users was 
arbitrary.132 In light of the fact that the classification was arbitrary, the court found 
that the classification could not be supported by the purported state interest to 
protect the safety of the roads and struck down the statute on equal protection 
grounds.133 
Similarly, Utah’s Metabolite Statute is constitutionally defective because it 
violates Utah’s uniform operation of laws clause. Because the law impermissibly 
distinguishes between similarly situated persons without any reasonable 
justification, the statute is constitutionally defective and must be overturned. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Utah legislature and courts need to evaluate the constitutionality of 
Utah’s Metabolite Statute. As it presently stands, the statute impermissibly 
punishes an individual’s status as a past drug user and fails to punish any direct act 
the individual may have committed. Because status offenses are unconstitutional, 
the statute must be overturned. Further, the statute impermissibly classifies and 
disparately impacts similarly situated individuals. Because there is no reasonable 
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justification for this disparate treatment, the statute must be found in violation of 
Utah’s uniform operation of laws clause and overturned. Although the Utah 
legislature is free to prosecute individuals for actual drug use or possession, the 
State may not use the Metabolite Statute as an end-run around the constitutional 
protections provided to the citizens of Utah. 
